Long-Term Military Transformation Broad Strategic Insights Workshop Syndicate Debriefs

26 September 2013

Syndicate 1

Sverre Diesen

Future Characteristic Model

Snowball Effect /Approaching Storm

Strategic Situational Awareness

- Breakdown of institutions and fracturing of identities coupled with greater interconnectedness have a global impact creating uncertainty and unpredictability.
- NATO needs to generate a long term recognised comprehensive picture to gain greater strategic situational awareness.
- Strategic situational awareness can be improved by better utilizing the existing interconnectedness between organizations and agencies worldwide.

Syndicate 1 Findings
BSI - 2

Future Characteristic Model

Global Brain/Filtering Worldviews

Proactive NATO

- NATO must improve its ability to deal with the effects of trans-national non-state groups, depending on the scope, scale and attribution of these effects.
- This will require a truly grand strategic approach to the challenges to the Westphalian order in conjunction with EU/AU/UN and other political decision-making bodies.
- It will take a combination of strategic soft and hard power solutions to deal with multi-layer trans-national groups, identities and problems.

Future Characteristic Model

Global Brain/Filtering Worldviews

Battle of the Narrative

- Information growth and dissemination facilitated by computer networks, coupled with a selective approach to seeking information, may contribute to the rise of prejudice, bigotry and fanaticism and hence to security challenges.
- NATO needs to recognize the importance of the "Battle of the Narrative" in the future, both internally and externally.
- Externally NATO needs to professionalize its information efforts and tailor its message to the target audience with more precision, drawing on cultural awareness and expertise.
- The information vacuum resulting from the failure to do so will be filled by other actors and narratives, thereby reducing NATO's ability to conduct its core tasks.

Syndicate 2

Stephan De Spiegeleire

Syndicate 2 / Process

- Introduction/First round of generic BSI collection (24)
- Discussion of first FCMs
- Discussion of Taxonomies/Handles
- First plenary round of First FCM/first core task
- Break-up in smaller groups for BSI development (35 BSIs – 100 bullets)
- Discussion, review and integration of BSIs (13 /
- Preparation of Debrief

Issues confronted (and dealt with)

- Issues with 'BSI' concept
  - **Essence**: two different aspects: characteristics / future tasks
  - **Formulation**: should be more precise
  - **Structure**: similar structure, description, length…
- Example (different ones now)
- Process

FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT Collective Defence

- Blurring of lines between military and law enforcement [ALL]

- NATO may need more law enforcement caps/1st responders,

- CoE for urban law enforcement

- Joint training, more cross-postings

- 'Protect' becomes more important + different forms [Prot]

- MD/CBRN/Cyber

FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT Collective Defence

- More emphasis on resilience [PREV]

- Return to the past (cities as main actors in conflict) [E]

- Who sits on the NAC? [Pol]

- Empowering of people/business

- Change mindset of dependency on Sec forces

- NATO role in designing 'smart cities

- New forms of 'walls'

- Redefine NATO responsibilities

FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT Collective Defence

- Increased density in all domains (also in air/maritime) [Sust/Prep]

- How to deal with that (C2 challenges)

- More emphasis on non-lethal strike AND more precision

- Critical littoral infrastructure becomes more important [C3]

- More cooperation with and between littoral cities and companies

Metropolis

- Diffuse Power Structure

CoopSec

- Ability to identify Governance/Security Actors Structure
- Civilian authorities on all levels
- Critical infrastructure
- Resource providers [C3/I/P]
- Ensure interoperability
- Adapt to different standards [C3/E/P]
- Cascaded Consultations

GlobGame/PolycBrain CollDef

- Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats

- proactive approach
- InfoMgt
- Conflict Prevention
- Integration (DIME)
- Civ – Mil (CA?)
- Out-Of-Area Ops

(C3 / I / E)

- Manage rise of other actors
- CRC

(E / P)

- New Model of Deterrence
- Tendency from Collective Defense to Collective Security

GlobGame/PolycBrain CRISIS MGMT

- Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats
- Importance of "Flow" security

- Prevention is critical element for core task achievement
- Comm channels between NATO and first responders
- Build a global knowledge network for situational awareness
- Develop advanced predictive analytic capabilities
- We may be deterred too
- CYBER Deterrence critical
- BMD/Theatre missile defense
- Arms control opportunities may present themselves
- Connectedness/cost of conflict

GlobGame/PolycBrain CRISIS MGMT

- Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats

- Importance of "Flow" security

- Integrate military capabilities
- More NATO bilaterals
- Need relationships with like and non-like minded nations
- Understand flows
- Intervention capability
- Deterrence becomes more important
- "Protect" still relevant
- Importance of "Flow" security

GlobGame/PolycBrain COOP SEC

- Data partnership

- Interagency collaboration on data
- Comprehensive decision making process
- Adaptive (to ever changing environment) leadership
- Out-of-box collaboration: industry, academic, foreign partners
- Security and disclosure policy
- Internal and external rule enforcement
- Better situational awareness by exploiting information ubiquity
- Better Prevent/Prepare for conflict by developing predictive capability
- Mutual Transparency

Metropolis Management

- Unclear situation picture
  - Conflicting Legitimacies/Loyalties
  - Intent of players
  - Informal Powerstructure
  - Mega-Cities action with global consequences
  - State not in control of the Mega-City
  - Self sustaining economy
  - Reliance on infrastructure

Crisis

- Conduct various parallel activities
- Develop and plan Non-Military capabilities
- Information Mngt
- Mandate for NATO

Cross-Cutting Take-Aways

- From response to prevention
- Info mngt/big data
- Towards more openness
- From defence to security
- From kinetic/lethal to non-kinetic/non-lethal
- Changing role of LoA (what iy is, how it is formulated,…)
- Comprehensive with mil as catalyst

- From NATO-centric to 'other'-centric
- Time compression
- Special ops become normal ops
- 'Old' terms (deterrence, arms control) may require a fresh look
- Sustaining political support/resourcing (including disinvestment)
- Foresight (also differently?)

Syndicate 3

Ian Bayless

Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model

Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Collective Defence

Cooperative Security

Crisis Management

Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities

- A NATO engagement space is where NATO must, should, and could act, a security environment is more global,
- Shift of power to the people: role of social media, culture of people change the role of ISR; social media analysis in a decentralized, instantaneous information based society
- Increased importance of agile strategic communication
- Increased demand for ISR due to expanded engagement space
- Technology enabled, Hybrid adversaries evolve; A range of state and non-state actors in all domains: Access to WMD/E, BMD
- Concept of 3 Cs (compete, cooperate, conflict)
- Networked adversaries: sophisticated, innovative; speed of innovation; Instantaneous proliferation
- NATO stabilize research and technology work
- Uncertainty of environment; prevalence of "fog" of conflicts
- Policy and legal framework to match advances in technology

Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model

Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Cooperative Security

Collective Defence

Integrated Security

- Coordination, cooperation, interoperability, integration, Alliance
- NATO as integrator facilitator with defence and security networks
- Functionality of a clearing house to come to an advanced cooperation in place
- More important and need more tools beyond partnership
- Cultural cooperation tools
- NATO influence is positive standards
- Coalition of the willing with partners
- Command and Control to focus and convergence
- Build Relationships with international institutions
- Use education more broadly to integrate partners
- Collect and process information for quick knowledge
- Develop partnerships and information sharing frameworks

Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model

Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Crisis Management

Collective Defence

Adaptive Shaping

- Crisis management new domains (e.g., cyber, human, [and how to address space domain])
- Comprehensive Approach will be as if not more important with a range of actors
- Develop resilience against chaos
- Ability to have specific and credible measures
- Deter human networks threats
- Affect adversary interests and values
- Resilience and security of allied systems (cyber …)
- Guarantee not be denied access to the global commons (global finance system)
- Outsourcing of capabilities improve cost effectiveness and incurs risk: NATO outsourcing buy-in to use collectively; for example, aircraft, demining, commercial ISR)
- Demand for efficiency

Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model

Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Collective Defence

Cooperative Security

Adaptive Deterrence

- Increasing ambiguity of Article 5 threats
- Broaden deterrence posture: increase our ability to deter polymorphous adversaries (concerning cyber and space, difficulty to track down origin)
- Decreased time for responding to aggressors and security challenges/opportunities
- Collective defence new domains (e.g., cyber, human, [and how to address space domain])
- Innovative and persistent ISR capabilities with rapid analysis, fusion, and dissemination
- Demand for resilience within chaotic environments as a component of deterrence
- Conventional attack cannot be asymmetric threat: Alliance conventional capabilities must remain credible and resilient

Survey Results

Mehmet Kınacı

Collective Defence

In your opinion, should NATO continue to focus on territorial defence and remain as a collective defence organization?

A. Yes
B. No

63%

37%

Yes

No

Collective Defence

In your opinion, do threats to NATO originate from NATO territory and NATO's immediate periphery?

A.   Yes
B.   No

60%

40%

Yes

No

Collective Defence vs. Collective Security

As threats to NATO are becoming more global, do you agree that NATO has the ability to adapt to become a collective security organization?

A.   Strongly Agree
B.   Agree
C.   Somewhat Agree
D.   Neutral
E.   Somewhat Disagree
F.   Disagree
G.   Strongly Disagree

Chart values:
- Strongly Agree: 4%
- Agree: 22%
- Somewhat Agree: 42%
- Neutral: 6%
- Somewhat Disagree: 17%
- Disagree: 4%
- Strongly Disagree: 4%

SFA and NDPP

Do you agree that the SFA timeframe, 2030 and beyond, provides a sufficiently long-term perspective to the Political Guidance as part of the NDPP?

A.   Strongly Agree
B.   Agree
C.   Somewhat Agree
D.   Neutral
E.   Somewhat Disagree
F.   Disagree
G.   Strongly Disagree

Bar chart:
- Strongly Agree: 22%
- Agree: 48%
- Somewhat Agree: 13%
- Neutral: 10%
- Somewhat Disagree: 4%
- Disagree: 3%
- Strongly Disagree: 0%

Do you agree that the trends expressed in the SFA are sufficiently reflected in the Future Characteristics Models (shifting sands, approaching storm, snowball effect, global brain etc.)?

A. Strongly Agree

B. Agree

C. Somewhat Agree

D. Neutral

E. Somewhat Disagree

F. Disagree

G. Strongly Disagree

| Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neutral	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
6%	21%	40%	16%	7%	7%	3%

Do you agree with the following definition of the BSI?
"A BSI is a fundamental characteristic of the future security environment that may indicate a change at the Political-Military level that informs future NATO missions, tasks, roles, and requirements."

A.   Strongly Agree

B.   Agree

C.   Somewhat Agree

D.   Neutral

E.   Somewhat Disagree

F.   Disagree

G.   Strongly Disagree

46%

28%

9%   9%

4%   4%

0%

Strongly Agree   Agree   Somewhat Agree   Neutral   Somewhat Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree

Future Characteristic Models (FCM)

Do you agree that current FCMs (shifting sands, approaching storm, snowball effect, global brain etc.) are suitable tools to help develop the Broad Strategic Insights (BSIs)?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree

Do you agree that the linkage between the SFA, FCMs and BSIs has been sufficiently developed?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree

Do you agree that the BSIs will answer the first part of the FFAO – what do the future characteristics mean for NATO in executing the three core tasks?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree

BSIs and FFAO

Do you agree that the BSIs should be developed by domain?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neutral	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
4%	19%	21%	13%	20%	19%	4%

Does a BSI need to affect more than one domain to be considered relevant?

A.   Strongly Agree

B.   Agree

C.   Somewhat Agree

D.   Neutral

E.   Somewhat Disagree

F.   Disagree

G.   Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree: 15%
Agree: 31%
Somewhat Agree: 6%
Neutral: 10%
Somewhat Disagree: 12%
Disagree: 19%
Strongly Disagree: 6%

Do you agree that the core tasks – collective defence, cooperative security, crisis management - will remain in effect for the next two decades – 2030 and beyond?

A.   Strongly Agree

B.   Agree

C.   Somewhat Agree

D.   Neutral

E.   Somewhat Disagree

F.   Disagree

G.   Strongly Disagree


Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neutral	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
15%	32%	18%	0%	19%	13%	3%

Do you agree that other tasks may become more relevant than the core tasks for NATO in the future?

A. Strongly Agree

B. Agree

C. Somewhat Agree

D. Neutral

E. Somewhat Disagree

F. Disagree

G. Strongly Disagree

Bar chart:
- Strongly Agree: 12%
- Agree: 16%
- Somewhat Agree: 22%
- Neutral: 7%
- Somewhat Disagree: 20%
- Disagree: 17%
- Strongly Disagree: 6%

Closing Remarks

Col Janos Szonyegi

Broad Strategic Insights

- ✓ Strategic Situational Awareness

- ✓ Proactive NATO

- ✓ Battle of the Narrative

- ✓ Blurring of lines between military and law enforcement

- ✓ 'Protect' becomes more important + different forms [Prot]

- ✓ More emphasis on resilience [PREV]

- ✓ Return to the past (cities as main actors in conflict) [E]

- ✓ Who sits on the NAC? [Pol]

Broad Strategic Insights

- ✓ Increased density in all domains (also in air/maritime) [Sust/Prep]
- ✓ Critical littoral infrastructure becomes more important [C3]
- ✓ **Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities**
- ✓ **`Integrated Security**
- ✓ **Adaptive Shaping**
- ✓ **Adaptive Deterrence**

FFAO Development to date

Strategic Foresight Analysis

5xThemes; 15xTrends; 34xDefence & Security Implications

O'gau July 2013

Future Characteristic Models 6xMetaphors

Shifting Sands – Globalized Polycentric Brain
Filtering Worlds – Snowball Effect
Approaching Storm – Global Game

Izmir Sept 2013

Cross Domain

6xBroad Strategic Insights

Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities
Integrated Security - Adaptive Shaping
Adaptive Deterrence

FFAO Development – Next WS

6xBroad Strategic Insights

Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities
Integrated Security - Adaptive Shaping
Adaptive Deterrence

Brussels, Belgium
20-21 November 2013

Domain Specific
Investigation

FFAO

FFAO Development – Next WS

✓ **Venue: Brussels, Courtyard Marriot – close to NATO HQ**

✓ **Time: 20-21 November 2013**

Key Messages to take home

✓ **Participation is crucial – please attend last event**

✓ **Please bring domain specific experts**

✓ **Delegation members from NATO HQ are welcomed**

✓ **Detailed information will be provided during opening session about**

- • **FFAO implementation timeline**

- • **Writing methodology**

- • **Review plan**

Long-Term Military Transformation Broad Strategic Insights Workshop

26 September 2013